Abstract. In CRYPTO 2007, Hofheinz and Kiltz formalized a security notion for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), called constrained chosen ciphertext (CCCA) security, which is strictly weaker than ordinary chosen ciphertext (CCA) security, and showed a new composition paradigm for CCA secure hybrid encryption. Thus, CCCA security of a KEM turned out to be quite useful. However, since the notion is relatively new and its definition is slightly complicated, relations among CCCA security and other security notions have not been clarified well. In this paper, in order to better understand CCCA security and the construction of CCCA secure KEMs, we study relations between CCCA and bounded CCA security, where the latter notion considers security against adversaries that make a-priori bounded number of decapsulation queries, and is also strictly weaker than CCA security. Specifically, we show that in most cases there are separations between these notions, while there is some unexpected implication from (a slightly stronger version of) CCCA security to a weak form of 1-bounded CCA security. We also revisit the construction of a KEM from a hash proof system (HPS) with computational security properties, and show that the HPS-based KEM, which was previously shown CCCA secure, is actually 1-bounded CCA secure as well. This result, together with the above general implication, suggests that 1-bounded CCA security can be essentially seen as a "necessary" condition for a CCCA secure KEM.
Introduction
Background and Motivation. Studies on constructing and understanding practical public key encryption (PKE) schemes secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) [26, 11] are important research topics in the area of cryptography. Among several approaches towards CCA secure PKE schemes, one of the promising approaches is to construct a PKE scheme via the hybrid encryption methodologies using a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) which encapsulates (i.e. encrypts) a random session-key, and a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) which encrypts an actual message using the session-key. Cramer and Shoup [10] show that if we combine a CCA secure KEM and a CCA secure DEM, we obtain a hybrid PKE scheme which is CCA secure. Abe et al. [1] show yet another hybrid encryption paradigm from a Tag-KEM, which is an extension of a KEM, and a passively secure DEM.
In CRYPTO 2007, Hofheinz and Kiltz [17] formalized a security notion for KEMs called constrained chosen ciphertext (CCCA) security, which is strictly weaker than ordinary CCA security. Then, they show that a CCA secure PKE scheme can be constructed by combining a CCCA secure KEM and a DEM satisfying the security of (one-time) authenticated encryption [4] . Therefore, CCCA security turned out to be a quite useful security notion for constructing a CCA secure PKE scheme.
However, the notion of CCCA security is relatively new, and the definition of CCCA security is slightly technically complicated compared to other existing security notions for KEMs, such as (ordinary) CCA security. Therefore, the relations between CCCA security and other security notions have not been studied and clarified well. Especially, "how" CCCA security is weak, compared to ordinary CCA security, seems not to have been understood well previously. It is naturally expected that the better we understand CCCA security itself, the higher the possibility we will come up with practical CCCA secure KEMs becomes, which will also lead to practical CCA secure PKE schemes.
So far, there are several positive and negative results regarding how close CCCA security and CCA security for KEMs are: Baek et al. [2] show that a CCCA secure KEM can be generically converted into a CCA secure one by using a one-time secure message authentication code. Hanaoka and Kurosawa [13] show that in fact, a CCCA secure KEM can be turned into a CCA secure one even without using any other additional building block, by using a part of the session-key (for a DEM) to check the consistency of a ciphertext in the decapsulation process. These results make us believe that CCCA security and CCA security for KEMs are in fact very close.
On the other hand, Choi et al. [7] show that the well-known KEM by Kurosawa and Desmedt [21] , which was shown to be CCCA secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in [17] , is not OW-2-CCA secure. That is, the session-key hidden in a ciphertext of the Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM can be recovered if an adversary can submit two decapsulation queries of its choice. This result, in contrast to the above positive results [2, 13] , makes us think that CCCA security is far from CCA security.
These previous results may illustrate that it is difficult to grasp what is actually achieved by CCCA security and what is not. The motivation of this work is to clarify the relations between CCCA security and other security notions, so that it leads to better understanding of CCCA security itself and also leads to insights for constructing practical CCCA secure KEMs in the future. For that purpose, we study relations between CCCA security and bounded CCA security [8] , which only captures security against adversaries that make a-priori bounded number of decapsulation queries (denoted by "q-CCA" forueries), and is also strictly weaker than CCA security in a different sense from CCCA security.
It is known that we can construct a "q-bounded CCA" secure KEM whose ciphertext consists of only one group element (and thus "optimal" ciphertext size as a KEM) under the DDH assumption [8] , for any predetermined polynomial q. On the other hand, the best known CCCA secure KEMs under the DDH assumption (or weaker assumptions) [21, 17, 12] have at least two group elements in a ciphertext. If we can construct a CCCA secure KEM under the DDH assumption with just one group element ciphertext, it will lead to (by combining it with a DEM satisfying the security of authenticated encryption) the best DDHbased PKE scheme in terms of the ciphertext overhead 3 , i.e. one group element plus the ciphertext overhead caused by the DEM, which can be as small as k-bit for k-bit security. We believe that studying relations between CCCA security and bounded CCA security will also lead to important insights for the possibility of such "space-efficient" CCA secure PKE schemes (under DDH and weaker assumptions). Especially, understanding "how hard" it is to construct a CCCA secure KEM compared to a KEM with bounded CCA security will benefit the future designers of CCCA secure KEMs.
Our Contribution. Firstly, in Section 3 we investigate relations between CCCA security and bounded CCA security, i.e. implications/separations between these two security notions. One might expect that there is always a separation of CCCA security from bounded CCA security, and vice versa. As expected, we show that in most cases we have separations in both directions, and thus our contribution regarding this result is to give formal proofs, together with some basic ideas, for the separations. In particular, we show that IND-CCCA security does not imply OW-2-CCA or IND-1-CCA security (here, OW and IND stand for "onewayness" and "indistinguishability", respectively, and the formal definitions for security notions are given in Section 2). Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, however, it turns out that there is an implication from CCCA security to the weakest form of bounded CCA security, namely, OW-1-CCA, if we slightly change the definition of a valid CCCA adversary. The change we make to show the implication is regarding the definition of uncertainty that plays an important role in defining CCCA security, but is quite subtle. The proof for this result involves some unusual treatment (at least in the context of security proofs of CCCA/bounded CCA security) of an adversary, and might be of independent interest. For more details, see Section 3.2. We also show the separation of the opposite direction (bounded CCA security does not imply CCCA security) in terms of the number of queries allowed for an adversary. Specifically, we show that for any polynomial q ≥ 0, IND-q-CCA security does not imply OW-(q + 1)-CCCA security.
Then, in Section 4 we revisit the construction of KEMs from a hash proof system (HPS) [9, 17] , and show that the HPS-based KEM, which was shown to be IND-CCCA secure [17] (under some computational security requirements), actually satisfies IND-1-CCA security under the same assumptions used to show its IND-CCCA security. This result should be contrasted with the above mentioned separation of IND-1-CCA from IND-CCCA. Given the hybrid encryption paradigm by Cramer and Shoup [10] , the result here implies that if we combine a HPS-based KEM (e.g. the Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM [21] ) with a CCA secure redundancy-free DEM (e.g. a strong pseudorandom permutation [25] ), the resulting PKE scheme still provides IND-1-CCA security. (As mentioned above, OW-2-CCA attack on this KEM is possible, and thus this is the optimal security result for the Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM, in terms of bounded CCA security.) Given the fact that using computational HPS is one of the major methodologies for constructing a practical CCCA secure KEM, we see that IND-1-CCA security can essentially be viewed as a "necessary" condition for a CCCA secure KEM. This result on the HPS-based KEM, together with the above general implication to OW-1-CCA security, also suggests that constructing a CCCA secure KEM is harder than constructing a 1-bounded CCA secure one. To the best of our knowledge, such insights have not been known previously.
Although it might be hard to imagine that 1-bounded CCA security (i.e. OW-1-CCA security and IND-1-CCA security) plays a practical role in real world applications in which KEMs (and PKE schemes) are used, 4 we stress that our aim in this paper is not to emphasize the importance of such security in practice, but rather to give better understanding of CCCA security itself, and we believe that our results give insights for constructing CCCA secure KEMs, and are useful for the future users/designers of CCCA secure KEMs.
Due to space limitation, the full proofs of the theorems in this paper will be given in the full version. We instead give proof sketches for each theorem.
Related Work. After Hofheinz and Kiltz [17] defined CCCA security, several practical CCCA secure KEMs have been proposed [6, 12, 20, 13, 14] . Hiwatari et al. [16] extended the CCCA secure KEM by Hanaoka and Kurosawa [12] to a CCCA secure multi-recipient KEM. Sakai et al. [27] used a OW-CCCA secure KEM which has reproducibility to construct a CCA secure KEM whose ciphertext length is shorter than that of the building block KEM, using a random oracle.
Bellare et al. [3] formalized the security notions for PKE schemes in a systematic way and showed the relations among security notions. For KEMs, Nagao et al. [23] and Herranz et al. [15] showed the relations among security notions. Moreover, Herranz et al. investigated the security notions achieved by hybrid encryption from a KEM and a DEM with several different levels of security.
Bellare and Sahai [5] and later Pass, Shelat, and Vaikuntanathan [24] investigated the relations among several types of non-malleability [11] . Cramer et al. [8] introduced bounded CCA security, and show that non-malleability is separated from bounded CCA security. Matsuda and Matsuura [22] considered parallel decryption queries (which was originally introduced by Bellare and Sahai [5] in the context of non-malleability of PKE schemes) in bounded CCA security of PKE schemes and KEMs, and show several general implication/separation results. We note that the relations among security notions we show in this paper are not covered by these previous works.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the basic notation and the definitions for a KEM.
Basic Notation. N denotes the set of all natural numbers, and if n ∈ N then [n] = {1, . . . , n}. "x ← y" denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from y if y is a finite set, x is output from y if y is a function or an algorithm, or y is assigned to x otherwise. If x and y are strings, then "|x|" denotes the bit-length of x, "msb(x)" denotes the most significant bit of x, and "x||y" denotes a concatenation x and y. "PPTA" denotes a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. If A is a probabilistic algorithm then y ← A(x; r) denotes that A computes y as output by taking x as input and using r as randomness. 
Syntax of KEMs.
A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) Γ consists of the following three PPTAs (KG, Enc, Dec):
The key generation algorithm that takes 1 k (security parameter k) as input, and outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk). Enc: The encapsulation algorithm that takes pk as input, and outputs a ciphertext c and a session-key K ∈ K (where K is the session-key space specified by pk). Dec: The (deterministic) decapsulation algorithm that takes sk and c as input, and outputs a session-key K which could be a special symbol ⊥ meaning "c is an invalid ciphertext".
We require Dec(sk, c) = K for all (pk, sk) output by KG and all (c, K) output by Enc(pk).
Security Notions for KEMs. Typically, security notions for KEMs are expressed by the combination of a security goal (GOAL) and an adversary's attack type (ATK). In this paper, we will treat indistinguishability (IND) and one-wayness (OW) as security goals, and chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), q-bounded chosen ciphertext attacks (q-CCA) [8] , constrained CCA (CCCA) [17] , and its q-bounded analogue, namely, q-bounded CCCA (q-CCCA) as an adversary's attack types, where q ≥ 0 is an integer. For a KEM Γ = (KG, Enc, Dec), we define the experiment Expt
(k) in which an adversary A attacks indistinguishability of Γ under the attack type 
ATK, and the experiment Expt

OW-ATK
Γ,A (k) in which A attacks one-wayness of Γ under ATK, as in Fig. 1 .
In the experiments, how the oracle O is defined and how it is available for A is determined depending on ATK in the following ways:
-If ATK = CPA, the oracle is unavailable and thus A cannot make any query. 
Moreover, A is not allowed to submit a query containing c * to O cdec . Additionally, if ATK = q-CCCA, A can submit at mostueries (as in q-CCA).
For a KEM Γ and GOAL ∈ {IND, OW}, let A be an adversary that runs in Expt GOAL-CCCA Γ,A (k) and makes in total Q queries, and let (pred i (·), c i ) be A's i-th CDEC query. "The running time of A in the GOAL-CCCA experiment" is defined as the sum of A's running time and the total of maximum running time for evaluating each pred i submitted by A. "The running time of the GOAL-CCCA experiment" is defined as the total running time of the whole experiment Expt GOAL-CCCA Γ,A (k) minus "the running time of A in the GOAL-CCCA experiment". For a CCCA adversary A and an experiment E (not necessarily Expt
Finally, we say that an adversary A is a valid GOAL-CCCA adversary if (1) "the running time of A in the GOAL-CCCA experiment" is polynomial in k, and (2) uncert A,E (k) is negligible for all experiments E whose running time is at most "the running time of GOAL-CCCA experiment" that A runs in. We define the notion of a "valid GOAL-q-CCCA adversary" in exactly the same way as above.
For a KEM Γ , an adversary A, and ATK ∈ {CPA, q-CCA, CCCA, q-CCCA}, we define IND-ATK advantage Adv
Relations between Constrained and Bounded Chosen Ciphertext Security
In this section, we investigate relations between constrained and bounded CCA security. One might expect that there is always a separation of CCCA security from bounded CCA security, and vice versa. It is actually the case, and we formally show that for most cases we have separations in both directions. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, however, it turns out that there is an implication from IND-CCCA security to the weakest form of bounded CCA security, namely, OW-1-CCA, if we slightly change the definition of a valid CCCA adversary. The rest of this section is organized as follows: In Section 3.1. we show the separations between CCCA and bounded CCA security. Then, in Section 3.2 we introduce slightly stronger CCCA security and its implication to OW-1-CCA security.
Separations
Basic Ideas for Separations. Notice that a CDEC query by a valid CCCA adversary A is answered with a value that is not ⊥ only when A already has some "non-trivial" knowledge about the decapsulation result, where the non-triviality is captured by the condition that A has to control the uncertainty negligible. We note that CDEC queries made by a valid CCCA adversary A cannot (except with negligible probability) reveal information on the decapsulation result that is hard to guess and is independent from A's view, because otherwise A's uncertainty cannot be negligible. We use this idea for showing the separations of bounded CCA security from CCCA security.
On the other hand, CDEC queries by a valid adversary A can reveal (while controlling A's uncertainty negligible) information that is dependent on some part of a public key, even if the decapsulation result itself is hard to guess, as long as it is non-trivial. This idea is later used to separate CCCA security from bounded CCA security in terms of the number of queries.
For simplicity, in this subsection we assume that the session-key space of a KEM is {0, 1} k when the key generation algorithm is run with input 1 k .
Parse SK as (sk, R) and C as (γ||c).
Decsep2(SK, C) : Parse SK as (sk, R) and C as (γ||c).
Parse P K as (pk, {Vi} i∈{0,...,q} ). The OW-2-CCA attack for Γ sep1 is easy: Consider the following OW-2-CCA adversary A. Given (pk, C * = (0||c * )), A computes (c ′ , K ′ ) ← Enc(pk), and submits ciphertexts C 1 = (1||c * ) and C 2 = (1||c ′ ) parallelly (i.e. non-adaptively) as decapsulation queries. According to the definition of Dec sep1 , A receives 
However, notice that the information on R is information-theoretically hidden from A's view in Game 2. Moreover, R is chosen uniformly from {0, 1} k , and thus the decapsulation result Dec(sk, c) ⊕ R of the query of the above type is also uniformly random and independent of A's view in Game 2. Then, the probability that some of A's CDEC queries of the form (pred, C = (1||c)) satisfies Dec sep1 (SK, C) = K ′ ̸ = ⊥ and pred(K ′ ) = 1 will be upperbounded by Q · uncert A,Game 2 (k), which is negligible due to the fact that A is a valid IND-CCCA adversary. Moreover, Game 2 can be perfectly simulated by another valid IND-CCCA adversary for the building block KEM Γ , which means that A's advantage in Game 2 is negligible. In summary, A's IND-CCCA advantage is upperbounded to be negligible.
⊓ ⊔
IND-CCCA vs. Non-malleability. In the above theorem, to break OW-2-CCA security of the KEM Γ sep1 , the two decapsulation queries can be made parallelly. Hence, due to the equivalence of non-malleability under chosen plaintext attack and indistinguishability under one parallel decapsulation query [5, 23, 15] , and the transitivity of the implication of security notions, it follows that IND-CCCA security does not imply non-malleability (under chosen plaintext attack). Fig. 2 (upper-right) .
The IND-1-CCA attack for Γ sep2 is quite easy to see. Consider the following (Dec(sk, c) )||R) where R is the value in the secret key (if c is not invalid). However, recall that this R is chosen uniformly at random, and is informationtheoretically hidden from A and independent of A's view in Game 2. Therefore, the predicates contained in A's CDEC queries of the above type are almost never satisfied by the corresponding decapsulation results due to the condition that A has to control its uncertainty negligible, which implies that the difference between A's success probability (in guessing the challenge bit) in Game 1 and that in Game 2 is negligible. More specifically, in the full proof, we show that the difference in A's success probability in these games is upperbounded by 2Q · uncert A,Game 2 (k) where Q is the total number of A's CDEC queries (the reason why "2" appears is because the value R in Γ sep2 is not k-bit but (k − 1)-bit, and we lose the factor 2 when relating it with the uncertainty that considers whether the predicates are satisfied by a k-bit randomness). The fact that A's advantage in Game 2 is negligible follows from the IND-CCCA security of the building block KEM Γ , as in Γ sep1 .
IND-q-CCA vs. OW-(q + 1)-CCCA. The above separations show that CCCA security does not imply bounded CCA security in most cases. Here, we show the separation of the opposite direction: if there is no trivial implication in terms of the number of queries, CCCA security is separated from bounded CCA security. Here, without loss of generality, we assume that the randomness space of KG is {0, 1} k . Moreover, let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * be a one-way function (OWF), whose existence is guaranteed by the existence of Γ . Using the KEM Γ and the OWF f , we construct another KEM Γ sep3 = (KG sep3 , Enc sep3 , Dec sep3 ) for the separation as in Fig. 2 (bottom) . In the following, whenever we treat an integer as a k-bit string, we use "hat" (e.g. 1 is the k-bit representation of 1).
The OW-(q + 1)-CCA attack against the KEM Γ sep3 is as follows (if q = 0, then we skip this part and goes to the (q + 1)-th query below):
, a OW-(q + 1)-CCCA adversary A defines the predicate pred i by "pred i (K) = 1 iff f (K) = V i ", and submits the i-th CDEC query of the form (pred i , C i = ( i||V i )). Since Dec sep3 (SK, C i ) = v i by definition, A receives v i from the oracle . After obtaining v 1 , . . . , v q , A defines the (q+1) -th predicate pred q+1 by "pred q+1 (K) = 1 iff KG(1 k ; K) = (pk, * )", sets C q+1 ← ( q + 1||v 0 ||v 1 || . . . ||v q ), and submits (pred q+1 , C q+1 ) to the oracle as the (q + 1)-th CDEC query. Since Dec(SK, C q+1 ) = R KG , A receives R KG as a response. A can then compute sk from R KG and decrypt c * , and thus A's OW-(q + 1)-CCCA advantage is 1. Here, we also have to show that the above A is a valid OW-(q + 1)-CCCA adversary. We have to be careful because we have to show that A's uncertainty is negligible for any experiment E that is as efficient as the original OW-(q +1)-CCCA experiment.
5 Fortunately, we can use the following statistical property that is satisfied by any OWF. (The proof is given in the full version.)
This guarantees that, for i ∈ [q], whatever value is assigned to V i by an experiment E, the probability that pred i is satisfied by a random K is negligible. Furthermore, recall that the key generation algorithm of any secure (at least OW-CPA secure) KEM can be viewed as a OWF whose domain is the randomness space of KG and whose image is pk (sk is discarded). Then we can use Lemma 1 also for the (q + 1)-th CDEC predicate pred q+1 , and conclude that uncert A,E (k) is negligible for any experiment E. IND-q-CCA security of Γ sep3 is explained as follows. Let A be any IND-q-CCA adversary against Π sep3 . Recall that a decapsulation query of the form C = ( q + 1||c) is answered with R KG only when all preimages v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v q are known to A. Since v 0 is the fixed value 1 k , A actually needs to find q preimages v 1 , . . . , v q . However, due to one-wayness of f , it is hard to find v i without making a decapsulation query of the form C = ( i||V i ). But since A can make onlyueries, if A makesueries to obtain (v 1 , . . . , v q ), A can no longer use the decapsulation oracle. This means that unless A breaks the OWF, A cannot make a decapsulation query of the form C = ( q + 1||c) that reveals R KG . Then, in order to break IND-q-CCA security of Γ sep3 , A has to essentially break IND-q-CCA security of the building block KEM Γ , which is hard by assumption. ⊓ ⊔
Slightly Stronger CCCA Security and Its Implication
In the previous subsection, we have seen that IND-CCCA security does not imply OW-2-CCA or IND-1-CCA security. Then, a natural question would be whether IND-CCCA security implies (or does not imply) OW-1-CCA security, which is the weakest bounded CCA security for KEMs. Actually, we could not show implication/separation from IND-CCCA. Alternatively, however, we find that if we consider a slightly stronger definition for IND-CCCA, we actually have an implication. The modification we will make is in the definition of uncertainty, and is quite subtle. We explain this in this subsection. Note that the IND-CCCA experiment is fixed if we fix the following: (a) the randomness for key generation ((pk, sk) ← KG(1 k )), (b) the randomness for challenge ciphertext/session-keys ((c * , K * 1 ) ← Enc(pk) and K * 0 ← K), (c) the challenge bit (b ← {0, 1}), and (d) the randomness for an adversary. We denote the process of randomly picking these randomness and fixing the IND-CCCA experiment by "E ← Expt 
Definitions for Computational HPS
Here, we review the definition of hash proof systems as defined by Cramer and Shoup [9, 21, 17] . (We mainly borrow the notations from [17] , which we customize slightly for our purpose.)
Let C, K, S, and P be sets, and V be the set of "languages" satisfying V ⊂ C. Let D sk : C → K be a hash function indexed by sk ∈ S. Informally speaking, a HPS is a special type of a designated-verifier proof system for a "subset membership problem" (i.e. whether a "statement" c ∈ C satisfies c ∈ V). A hash function D sk is said to be projective if there exists an efficiently computable projection µ : S → P such that pk = µ(sk) ∈ P defines the action of D sk over the subset V. That is, for every c ∈ V, the value K = D sk (C) is uniquely determined by µ(sk) and c. In the context of the HPS-based KEM that will be explained later, we will identify C as the ciphertext space, V as the set of all valid ciphertexts, S as the secret key space, P as the public key space, K as the session-key space, µ(·) as the key generation algorithm, and D sk (·) as the decapsulation algorithm. Taking this into account, hereafter we call an element c ∈ C valid if c ∈ V and invalid if c ∈ C\V. As usual, we require: (1) C is efficiently recognizable, (2) a valid element c ∈ V can be efficiently sampled together with a witness w about the fact that c ∈ V, and (3) we can sample elements from C\V, S, and K efficiently and (statistically close to) uniformly.
The above are the description of the parameters for a HPS. For simplicity, we assume that the definitions of the sets and the functions we described above are generated and determined by a probabilistic algorithm HGen. Formally, a HPS Π consists of the following three PPTAs (HGen, Pub, Priv): HGen: The parameter generation algorithm for HPS which takes 1 k as input, and outputs parameters pub = (C, V, K, S, P, D (·) : C → K, µ : S → P). For notational convenience, we assume that pub is provided as input to the following algorithms Pub and Priv, and do not write it explicitly. Pub: The (deterministic) public evaluation algorithm which takes pk = µ(sk) ∈ P, a valid element/witness pair (c, w) (where w is about the fact that c ∈ V) as input, and outputs a hash value K = D sk (c). Priv: The (deterministic) private evaluation algorithm which takes sk ∈ S and an element c ∈ C as input, and outputs a hash value K = D sk (c).
For all pub ← HGen(1 k ), we require the following: (1) for all c ∈ C and all sk ∈ S, it holds that Priv(sk, c) = D sk (c), and (2) for all c ∈ V with the corresponding witness w (about the fact that c ∈ V), and all sk ∈ S, it holds that Pub(µ(sk), c, w) = Priv(sk, c) = D sk (c). Security Requirements. As usual, we define the subset membership problem for a HPS Π and its hardness. 
Definition 4. We say that the subset membership problem in a HPS
Hofheinz and Kiltz [17] defined the computational analogue of strong universal 2 that is defined in [21] for a HPS, called computational universal 2 (CU 2 security, for short), which we recall here. The CU 2 experiment Expt CU2 Π,A (k) for a HPS Π that an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) runs in is defined as in Fig. 3 (left) . In the experiment, it is required that A 1 's output c ′ satisfy c ′ ∈ C\V and c ′ ̸ = c * .
Definition 5. We say that a HPS Π is CU 2 secure if the advantage function Adv
is negligible for any PPTA A. Moreover, we define a universal 1 -analogue of CU 2 security, which we call computational universal 1 (CU 1 security, for short). We define the CU 1 experiment Expt CU1 Π,A (k) for a HPS Π that an adversary A runs in as in Fig. 3 (upper-right) Although CU 1 security is not explicitly defined in [17] , it seems to us that this security is implicitly used for proving the CCCA security of the HPS-based KEM. Jiang and Wang [19] defined a slightly stronger version of CU 2 security which allows the second stage adversary A 2 to have access to the oracle O. This version of CU 2 security is satisfied by all known instantiations of HPS (see the following paragraph), and implies CU 1 security defined here. Thus, CU 1 security is not an additional security requirement for a HPS in practice. The reason why we introduce CU 1 security separately is that we believe that it makes our security analysis clearer. We also remark that CU 1 security is strictly weaker than "smoothness" defined in [19, Def. 7] .
KG(1 k ) : pub ← HGen(1 k ) sk ← S; pk ← µ(sk) P K ← (pub, pk) Return (P K, sk).
Enc(P K) :
Pick c ∈ V uniformly together with a witness w. K ← Pub(pk, c, w) Return (c, K).
Dec(sk, c) :
K ← Priv(sk, c) Return K. Concrete Instantiations of HPS. There are several known concrete instantiations of computational HPS that satisfy the above security requirements. The Kurosawa-Desmedt HPS [21, 17] based on the DDH assumption, and its n-linear variant under the n-linear assumption [17] , both of which are discrete logarithmtype constructions. Meanwhile, we also have a computational HPS based on the Paillier's decision composite residuosity assumption [9] . For more details, see [9, 17] and the references therein.
HPS-based KEM and Bounded CCA Security
Let Π = (HGen, Pub, Priv) be a HPS. Then, the HPS-based KEM Γ Π = (KG, Enc, Dec) [21, 17] is constructed as in Fig. 4 . The following was shown by Hofheinz and Kiltz [17] . We show that under the same assumptions on the HPS used to prove its IND-CCCA security, the KEM Γ Π satisfies IND-1-CCA security as well. Intuition. CU 1 security of Π guarantees that, under the situation where the challenge ciphertext c * is sampled from invalid elements (i.e. c * ← C\V), the real challenge session-key K * 1 = D sk (c * ) looks random to A, as long as A's decapsulation query is a valid one. However, A is free to choose a ciphertext for a decapsulation query, and in particular, it can be invalid. This is the place where CU 2 security comes into play. CU 2 security of Π guarantees that, even if A's decapsulation query c is an invalid one, A gets no significant information from the response, compared to just receiving a random value in K, as long as A does not make any query after this query (and it is guaranteed because A is an IND-1-CCA adversary). Therefore, CU 1 and CU 2 together guarantee that A's decapsulation query essentially gives no significant information for distinguishing the real challenge session-key K
